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VCC is a computing paradigm which consists of vehicles cooperating with each other to realize a lot of practical applications,
such as delivering packages. Security cooperation is a fundamental research topic in Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC). Because
of the existence of malicious vehicles, the security cooperation has become a challenging issue in VCC. In this paper, a trust-
based model for security cooperating, named DBTEC, is proposed to promote vehicles’ security cooperation in VCC. DBTEC
combines the indirect trust estimation in Public board and the direct trust estimation in Private board to compute the trust value of
vehicles when choosing cooperative partners; a trustworthy cooperation path generating scheme is proposed to ensure the safety
of cooperation and increase the cooperation completion rates in VCC. Extensive experiments show that our scheme improves the
overall cooperation completion rates by 6∼7%.
1. Introduction
Many new applications have been raised on the vehicular
technology by V2V (Vehicle-to-Vehicle) and V2I (Vehicle-
to-Infrastructure) communications [1–5]. Recently, several
researches related to the combination of cloud computing
and vehicular networks [4, 5] are proposed. A Platform as
a Service (PaaS) model provides cloud services for mobile
vehicles [6–8]. Hussain et al. describe architectures of Vehic-
ular Clouds (VC), namely, Vehicles using Clouds (VuC) and
HybridClouds (HC), inwhich vehicles play roles of cloud ser-
vice providers and clients, respectively [9]. Vehicular Cloud
Computing (VCC) is one of the most promising paradigms
[1, 4, 9–11]. VCC, which consists of vehicles cooperating the
resources of computing, has a significant impact on applica-
tions [9, 11]. However, VCC is different from the traditional
cloud infrastructure and requires a sophisticated security and
privacy protection approach because the legitimate users and
attackers have the same privileges [1, 4, 12–19].
One of the promising applications in VCC is performing
tasks by vehicles’ cooperation. This application, which is
more difficult than the existing ones in depth and breadth,
has important significance: in the traditional Delay Tolerant
Network (DTN) and Peer-to-Peer Network, it can only
disseminate information. But, in VCC, not only can this
application disseminate information, but also it can do more
practical work, such as delivering packages, luggage, and
credentials [1, 4, 10, 11].
Taxi network is a typical scenario ofVCC. Each taxi in this
scenario is regarded as a vehicle which can share information
by communicating in a point-to-point manner and accessing
internal broadcast by communication devices. From the per-
spective of traditional view, taxis can be modeled as mobile
nodes in DTN. However, more applications can be achieved
when modeled in VCC. In particular, when performing a
task, vehicle can apply for cooperating with several vehicles,
which will improve service quality and reduce resource
consumption. Listed below are several concrete examples.
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(a) Vehicle 𝐴 has received a user request and promised to
pick up a passenger in street 𝑆 at timestamp 𝑇, but traffic
jam has made it impossible for vehicle 𝐴 to finish this task.
In this situation, vehicle 𝐴 can request vehicle 𝐵 to perform
this task. There are two preconditions when selecting vehicle
𝐵. First, vehicle 𝐵 has ability to fulfil this task; second, vehicle
𝐵 should be trustworthy. (b) Vehicle 𝐴 has received a user
request and promised to perform a task which cannot be
finished by itself individually, such as picking up a tourist
group. In this situation, vehicle 𝐴 should select 𝑛 reliable
vehicles and send cooperation request to them for performing
this task together. (c) Vehicle 𝐴 has received a user request
and promised to deliver an important package to person 𝑃
in street 𝑆. In real scenario, this task has to be performed by
cooperation of several vehicles. For instance, first, vehicle 𝐴
delivers this package to vehicle 𝐵; then vehicle 𝐵 delivers it
to vehicle 𝐶; finally, vehicle 𝐶 delivers it to person 𝑃. This
process forms a cooperation path. In order to guarantee the
safety of the package, how to select trustworthy vehicles in
cooperation path is a challenging problem.
The examples listed above can be summarized as the
following application scenario: vehicle 𝐴 has received a user
request for performing certain tasks. These tasks not only
include the traditional applications in DTN [20–22], such as
relaying information, but also can be extended to physical
request, such as delivering objects. However, for some reason,
vehicle 𝐴 cannot fulfil the task by itself. In order to finish
this task, it sends request for cooperation to 𝑛 vehicles which
are willing to offer help. In the cases when vehicles which
received the cooperation request still cannot fulfil the tasks
by themselves, they will further send this cooperation request
to other vehicles recursively to request from them to offer
help to finish the remaining tasks, which forms a nontrivial
cooperation path.
Figure 1 illustrates a concrete example of the summarized
application scenario: when vehicle 𝐴 receives a user request
of delivering a package to person 𝑃 in street 𝑆 as soon as
possible. If vehicle 𝐴 can finish this whole task by itself, it
will provide services to user directly, which forms a trivial
cooperation path whose length is 1 hop, namely, a hop from
user to vehicle 𝐴. If vehicle 𝐴 cannot deliver the package to
person𝑃 directly, vehicle𝐴will finish what it can do and then
send messages to other vehicles to ask if they are willing to
cooperate to perform the rest of the task. Vehicles that give
positive response form a set Υ. Vehicle 𝐴 will select several
trustworthy vehicles in set Υ and send cooperation request
to them. Assume vehicle 𝐵 has received cooperation request
from vehicle 𝐴. If vehicle 𝐵 can finish the whole task by
itself, it will provide services to requestor vehicle𝐴 directly. If
vehicle 𝐵 still cannot finish the task by itself, it will do what it
can do and further recursively send the cooperation request
to other vehicles just like vehicle 𝐴. This recursive process
forms a nontrivial cooperation path. Every cooperation path
corresponds to a solution to user request.
There are several challenges in this application scenario.
(a) The first challenge is lack of trust information. How
to choose trustworthy vehicles is a vital problem in this
application scenario. However, there are thousands of vehi-
cles in a metropolis. It is unrealistic for a vehicle to have
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Figure 1: Cooperation path.
trust information of all vehicles in the metropolis. In fact,
for a certain vehicle, the reliability of most of vehicles is
unknown. When a vehicle needs cooperation to perform a
task, such as delivering a package, the phenomenon of lack
of trust informationmakes choosing trustworthy cooperative
vehicles difficult. (b) The second challenge is ensuring the
safety and success of tasks. In traditional communication
network, such as DTN, we can encrypt information to ensure
the safety and privacy. Even if the encrypted information
is destroyed by attackers, we still can retransmit this infor-
mation to ensure the task’s reliability [20–26]. Things are
different in VCC; physical objects can also be delivered in this
paradigm. Irreversible loss will bemade if the physical objects
are ruined by malicious vehicles.
In this paper, a trust-basedmodel is proposed to promote
the secure cooperation in VCC. Listed below are the contri-
butions of this paper.
(1) A double board based trust estimation and correction
(DBTEC) scheme is proposed to predict the reliability of
vehicles and guide the selection of trustworthy cooperative
vehicles in a more effective manner. In traditional scheme,
vehicles use information acquired in direct interactions with
other vehicles to update the trust information of other
vehicles. But inDBTEC scheme, Public board is introduced to
enrich themethod of acquiring trust information. Every vehi-
cle stores the service quality and trust information of other
vehicles, which are acquired in the direct interactions with
other vehicles, in their own storage, called Private board. In
addition, they use Public board,which stores public estimated
service quality for other vehicles reported by all vehicles in
cloud to update and correct the trust information stored in
Private board. The method of updating and correcting trust
information from Public board, called trust value estimation
model, is based on the following inference: the information
acquired from direct interaction is trustworthy; vehicles can
use this information as touchstone to confirm if a certain
vehicle is trustworthy. Then, based on the public estimated
service quality related to the trustworthy vehicle in Public
board, vehicles can update and correct the trust information
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of other vehicles in Private board and use the revised trust
information to guide their future selection of cooperative
partners.
(2) A new method of constructing cooperation path is
proposed in this paper. In traditional scheme, the cooperation
path is fixed once it is constructed. This static method is not
suitable for VCC. In this paper, we propose a dynamic coop-
eration path construction scheme. In the proposed scheme,
every vehicle dynamically searches and selects cooperative
vehicles and constructs new node in cooperation path by
analyzing the feedback of detections. The new vehicles will
recursively repeat this process until finishing the task.
(3) Extensive theoretical analysis and simulation have
been made to prove the effectiveness of this paper from
aspects of security and reliability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
related works are reviewed. In Section 3, the system model,
threat model, and problem statement are described. In
Section 4, the DBTEC schemes are proposed. Section 5 gives
the analysis of experimental results. We conclude this paper
in Section 6.
2. Related Work
Extensive researches have been done on the topic of trust
computing and inference [27–30] and they have been applied
to various networks, such as Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file-sharing
networks [31, 32], service network [1, 9, 18], wireless sensor
networks (WSNs) [30], crowd sensing network [3], and social
networks [28].The aim of trust computing and inference is to
select cooperative partner using computed trust value infor-
mation [29]. Kamvar et al. [31] proposed trust computing and
inference scheme in the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file-sharing net-
works based on historical uploads, which is called EigenTrust.
Inferring trust information through historical behaviors is a
commonmethod used in networks. In EigenTrust scheme, to
encourage legitimate and trustworthy behaviors and improve
the network’s overall performance, some privilege is given to
trustworthy objects. The main difficulties of EigenTrust are
that, when applying it to distributed network, it is difficult
to share trust information with others. This proposal mainly
concentrates on P2P file-sharing networks. However, in a
dynamic environment, such as vehicular ad hoc networks
(VANETs), this proposal is not feasible.
Haddadou et al. give a dynamic solution based on
reputation model for vehicles in [27], which differs from the
solution in [31]. The basic idea of [27] is to add a category
criterion to drivers.
However, the amount of trust information acquired in
direct interactions is limited. In a large network, the number
of nodes can be up to thousands. So the trust information
acquired from direct interactions is sparse in that network.
Judging the reliability of vehicles only using direct inter-
actions will lead to cold start problem. There are several
definitions of cold start. The main idea of cold start is
that when a new object enters the network, because of the
deficiency of trust information acquired from interactions, it
is hard to judge if a vehicle is malicious, which makes choos-
ing a right cooperative partners difficult [28]. To overcome
the cold start problem, researchers introduce the concepts
of direct trust information and indirect trust information.
Direct trust information is acquired in the direct interactions
between two objects. Indirect trust information is the trust
information inferred from other objects’ recommendation
trust information. For example, object 𝐴 has no direct
interactionswith object𝐶, but object𝐴has directly interacted
with object 𝐵. Assuming that object𝐴’s trust value to object 𝐵
is 𝑃𝐴→𝐵 and object 𝐵 recommends object 𝐶 to object 𝐴 with
trust value 𝑅𝐴→𝐵, object 𝐴 can infer that the trust value to
object 𝐶 is 𝑅𝐴→𝐶 = 𝑃𝐴→𝐵 ×𝑅𝐴→𝐵 from the recommendation
trust information. Combining direct trust information and
indirect trust information enhances the computation of trust
value [28], but how to effectively compute the trust value is a
complicated issue, which needs an extensive research.
The traditional application in VCC is disseminating
information. For example, Rostamzadeh et al. propose a
safe and reliable trust-based framework for disseminating
information in vehicular networks [29]. With the advance
of crowd sensing network, Internet of Vehicles, and Internet
of Everything, delivering physical objects is becoming an
emergent application in society. The safety and reliability of
delivering physical objects are important requirement in this
application,which becomes a key issue in research.This paper
discusses this issue in detail.
3. The System Model and Problem Statement
3.1. System Model. Suppose that there are 𝑛 registered vehi-
cles. 𝜙 = {𝑉1, 𝑉2, . . . , 𝑉𝑛} is the set of vehicles. All vehicles will
move randomly in a limited area.
There are two kinds of service requests in VCC: user
requests and cooperation requests. The major difference
between them is that user requests are generated by users, but
cooperation requests are generated by vehicles.The following
paragraphs describe these two kinds of requests.
Typical instances of user requests include delivering pack-
ages, picking up passengers, or tourist group with minimized
costs. Vehicles can accept user requests and provide services
to requestors for some payment. Once vehicles’ accepted user
requests cannot be finished by themselves, they will select
several trustworthy vehicles which are willing to provide
services and send cooperation request to them.
Once those vehicles receive cooperation requests, they
will cooperate to provide services together.These vehicles still
may not be able to fulfil the tasks by themselves and further
send cooperation requests to other trustworthy vehicles
recursively. This recursive process will form a nontrivial
cooperation path (see Figure 1(b)).
All cooperation path forms set C = {c1, c2, . . . , c𝑠} in
which c𝑖 is a trivial/nontrivial cooperation path. |C| = 𝑠
is the number of cooperation paths in VCC. The length of
cooperation path c𝑖 is |c𝑖|, which is equal to the number of
cooperation requests generated to finish a task. A cooperation
path can be subdivided tomany subcooperation paths, whose
starting nodes are one of the nodes in the paths and ending
nodes are the original paths’ ending nodes; this concept will
be used in Section 4.4.
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The quality of service (QoS) can be modeled as a value
between 0 and 1 called service quality. Different vehicles can
provide different quality of service. For vehicle 𝑉𝑖, its service
quality is 𝑄𝑖. The set of service quality of all vehicles is 𝑄 ={𝑄1, 𝑄2, . . . , 𝑄𝑛}.
Vehicles in Φ can be categorized into two types: normal
vehicles and malicious vehicles. Malicious vehicles will use
various means to strive for the opportunities of providing
services, such as reporting mendacious trust value or service
quality and colluding with other malicious vehicles. Once
malicious vehicles get the opportunities, they will screw the
service requests up in various manners, such as colluding
with other malicious vehicles to provide low-quality services
or destroy packages, to disrupt the network, and to ben-
efit themselves. Assume that the first ℎ vehicles in Φ are
malicious, which consist of set 𝑀 = {𝑉1, 𝑉2, . . . , 𝑉ℎ}. The
remaining vehicles are normal, which consist of set 𝑁 =
{𝑉ℎ+1, 𝑉ℎ+2, . . . , 𝑉𝑛}. Obviously,𝑀∪𝑁 = 𝜙.
In order to preventmalicious vehicles fromdisrupting the
network, normal vehicles should avoid sending cooperation
requests to them. They store the estimated trust value and
estimated service quality for other vehicles in storage, called
Private board, and use this information to guide the selection
of trustworthy vehicles when sending cooperation requests.
As will be illustrated in Section 4.3, the Private board of
vehicle 𝑉𝑖 can be modeled by two sets:
𝐸𝑖 = {𝐸𝑖1, 𝐸𝑖2, . . . , 𝐸𝑖𝑛} ,
𝑅𝑖 = {𝑅𝑖1, 𝑅𝑖2, . . . , 𝑅𝑖𝑛} ,
(1)
where 𝐸𝑖𝑗 is the estimated service quality of 𝑉𝑗 recorded by
𝑉𝑖 and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 is the estimated trust value of 𝑉𝑗 recorded by 𝑉𝑖.
Several timestamps (𝑇𝑖, 𝑇col𝑖 , and 𝑇row𝑖 ) are also recorded to
trace the recording time.
Besides Private board, In DBTEC schemes, all vehicles
can access a public cloud storage space, called Public board,
anywhere and selectively report their estimated service qual-
ity for other vehicles to it. Vehicles can use the information
in Public board to update the estimated trust value stored in
Private board. As will be illustrated in Section 4.3, the Public
board can bemodeled by two 𝑛×𝑛matrices,𝐸󸀠 and𝑇󸀠, where
𝐸󸀠 records the public estimated service quality reported by
vehicles and 𝑇󸀠 records the reporting timestamps.
Note that estimated service quality is selectively reported
to Public board, which means some service quality informa-
tion may not be updated to Public board. Several reasons
may result in this phenomenon: privacy protection, avoiding
revenge, and network interruption.
3.2. Threat Model. There are ℎ malicious vehicles in VCC,
which consist of set𝑀 = {𝑉1, 𝑉2, . . . , 𝑉ℎ}; four possible mali-
cious behaviors are listed below. These malicious behaviors
can be combined to form sophisticated malicious models,
such as providing unstable services. In Section 5.3, five
malicious models are introduced to analyze the performance
of DBTEC schemes.
(1) Report False Self-Estimated Service Quality to Public Board
When Registering. High-quality service is wanted by users.
Normal vehicles and users tend to choose vehicles providing
high-quality services as cooperative partners. Normal vehicle
𝑉𝑖 reports true service quality 𝑄𝑖 it can provide, which is
called self-estimated service quality, to Public board when
registering.Malicious vehicles can deceive normal vehicles by
reportingmendacious self-estimated service quality to Public
board; this deception method is effective especially in the
stage of cold start, in which trust information is deficient.
(2) Slander Normal Vehicles. As described above, normal
vehicles and users tend to choose vehicles providing high-
quality services as cooperative partners. Slander normal
vehicles by reporting estimated service quality lower than
normal level to Public board will reduce the probability
that normal vehicles get opportunities of providing services,
which increase themalicious vehicles’ opportunity indirectly.
Generally speaking, this can be regarded as a kind of
collusion attack since all malicious vehicles can benefit from
cooperatively slandering normal vehicles and acquire much
more opportunities to provide services.
(3) Collude with Malicious Vehicles by Praising Malicious
Partners.This is a stronger collusion attack than the previous
one since it has direct impacts on confusing normal vehicles.
It praises malicious vehicles by reporting estimated service
quality above their normal level to Public board, which
can directly increase malicious vehicles’ opportunities of
providing services.
(4) Malicious Vehicles Camouflage Themselves as Normal
Vehicles by Acting Like Them in Most of Time. Malicious
vehicles can pretend to be normal vehicles by behaving just
like them and provide unstable services. In this malicious
scenario, the malicious vehicles behave normally generally.
However, sometimes they will act some malicious behavior
to benefit themselves. Because of the camouflage, this attack
is hard to find.
3.3. Problem Statements. Theapplication scenario considered
in this paper is as follows: in Vehicular Cloud Computing
(VCC), vehicles will receive user’s service requests and
provide services to them. In the process of providing services
to users, if vehicles can finish the task, they will provide
services directly to users, which forms a trivial cooperation
path whose length is 1 hop (see Figure 1(a)). But vehicles may
not be able to finish the task by themselves for some reason.
In this case, vehicles will choose several trustworthy vehicles
which are willing to offer help and send cooperation request
to them. Vehicles which receive cooperation request still may
not be able to completely finish the task by themselves. They
will recursively send cooperation requests to other vehicles
until the task is finished.The recursive process of completing
tasks forms a nontrivial cooperation path (see Figure 1(b)).
A cooperation path corresponds to a solution to user request
in this application scenario. Specifically, the cooperation path
is trivial in the case when vehicle which receives the user
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request can finish the user request directly and no further
cooperation happened. The key challenge of this application
scenario is how to select vehicles, which can guarantee the
success of the service and maximize the quality of service for
cooperation.
In the process of cooperation, vehicles may wrongly
choose malicious vehicles for cooperation, which will lead to
the failure of the cooperation. We refer to selecting a vehicle
to cooperate as a choice. A wrong choice means selecting
a malicious vehicle for cooperation. A right choice means
selecting a normal vehicle for cooperation. If there exists a
wrong choice in a cooperation path, we say this cooperation
path is failed.There are three aims in the application scenario
to overcome the challenge described above.
(1) Minimize Failure Rate of Cooperation. Assume that all
cooperation paths in VCC form set C = C𝑌 ∪ C𝑁, where
C𝑌 is the set of successful cooperation paths and C𝑁 is the
set of failed cooperation paths. So the number of cooperation
paths is |C| and the number of failed cooperation paths is
|C𝑁|. The failure rate of cooperation is defined as 𝜃C and we
should minimize it:
𝜃C =
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨C𝑁󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
|C| . (2)
(2) Minimize the Failure Rate of Choices. Similarly, assume
that all choices in VCC form set = c𝑌 ∪ c𝑁, where c𝑌 is the
set of right choices and c𝑁 is the set of wrong choices. So the
number of choices is |c| and the number of wrong choices is
|c𝑁|. The failure rate of choices is defined as 𝜃c and we should
also minimize it:
𝜃c =
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨c𝑁󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
|c| . (3)
(3) Maximize Quality of Service of All Cooperation Paths.
We define the quality of service of a cooperation path as
the minimum service quality provided by vehicles in the
cooperation path. This definition is reasonable because of
the Cannikin law. Assume that the quality of service of
cooperation path 𝑖 is Q𝑖, where 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |C|}. Therefore
the total quality of services is ∑|C|𝑖=1Q𝑖. We should maximize
the average service quality of cooperation path:
∑|C|𝑖=1Q𝑖
|C| . (4)
In general, we can combine the above three optimization
requirements and try to find a scheme which satisfies the
following three formulas together in this application scenario
of VCC:
minimize 𝜃c =
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨c𝑁󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
|c| ,
minimize 𝜃c =
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨c𝑁󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
|c| ,
maximize
∑|C|𝑖=1Q𝑖
|C| .
(5)
Notations describes some important notations used
throughout this paper.
4. DBTEC Schemes
4.1. Overview. The main contribution of DBTEC schemes
is to combine Public board with Private board to guide the
selection of cooperative vehicles. In traditional scheme, vehi-
cles can only acquire trust information from direct interac-
tions with other vehicles [28]. Unlike the traditional scheme,
in DBTEC schemes, vehicle 𝐴 not only uses the information
acquired in direct interaction but also uses trustworthy
vehicles’ public estimated service quality stored in Public
board. When vehicle 𝐴 needs to cooperate, it will choose
a cooperative partner. DBTEC schemes use the information
stored in Public board, which is a public information storage
stored in cloud, to update the estimated trust value stored
in vehicle 𝐴’s Private board and then uses updated Private
board to further guide the selection of proper cooperative
partners. In DBTEC schemes, vehicles with high estimated
trust value in vehicle𝐴’s Private board are called trustworthy.
The trustworthy vehicles’ public estimated service quality
stored in Public board is just like the touchstone used to test
whether an unfamiliar vehicle is malicious. When vehicle 𝐴
trusts vehicle 𝐵, DBTEC will check public estimated service
quality for all vehicles reported by vehicle 𝐵 in Public board
and all estimated service quality for vehicle 𝐵 reported by all
vehicles to find the inconsistency and use the inconsistency
to find malicious vehicles.
Compared with traditional scheme, DBTEC scheme has
major advantages. One of them is overcoming the problem
that trust information is deficient in the stage of cold start.
In the stage of cold start, vehicles do not have enough trust
information to guide the selection of cooperative partners,
which will significantly increase the probability that mali-
cious vehicles get the opportunity of providing services.
DBTEC scheme uses the trust information we already have
as a touchstone to check the consistency and inconsistency
in Public board and further updates the Private board’s
trust information. This process is just like diffusion of trust
information; vehicles will get a lot of indirect information
from the process, which will overcome the problem that trust
information is deficient and increase the accuracy rate of
selecting right vehicles.
Described below are theDBTEC schemes fromhigh level.
As described in system model, there are 𝑛 vehicles in
VCC. Different vehicles can provide different quality of
service. For vehicle 𝑉𝑖, its service quality is 𝑄𝑖. Vehicles can
be categorized into two types: malicious vehicles and normal
vehicles.There are ℎmalicious vehicles in VCC. Public board
is a public cloud storage which can be accessed by vehicles
anywhere. All vehicles can report their estimated service
quality for other vehicles to Public board. All vehicles store
a Private board in which they keep their own estimated trust
value and estimated service quality information for other
vehicles.
For a normal vehicle 𝑉𝑖, when vehicle 𝑉𝑖 receives a user
request, it will check if it can be done by itself; if not, it will
search for vehicles which are willing to perform this task,
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Figure 2: The process of cooperation in DBTEC.
use trust value estimation model to update the information
stored in Private board using the information stored in
Public board, choose several cooperative vehicles using the
synthesized scorewhich is computed from the estimated trust
information and service quality information stored in Private
board, and send cooperation requests to them. After the
cooperative vehicles provide services to vehicle 𝑉𝑖, vehicle 𝑉𝑖
will rate the service quality of cooperative vehicles, update the
estimated service quality information and trust information
in Private board, and selectively report the estimated service
quality to Public board.
For a malicious vehicle 𝑉𝑗, it will use various methods
to strive for the opportunities of providing services. Once
malicious vehicles get these opportunities, they will screw
the service requests up in various manners to disrupt the
network and benefit themselves. Common malicious behav-
iors include reporting false self-estimated service quality,
slandering normal vehicles, praising malicious partners, and
providing unstable services (see Section 3.2).
Figure 2 illustrates a concrete example of the process of
cooperation in DBTEC. A passenger in train station wants
to hire a taxi; he sends user request by mobile phone to
vehicle 𝐴 with blue shadow. Unfortunately, when vehicle 𝐴
is driving to train station, it encounters a traffic jam in a
street. Obviously, it cannot finish the task by itself in time.
It seeks neighboring vehicles which are willing to offer help
and combines trust information stored in Private board with
information stored in Public board to predict the reliability
of these neighboring vehicles. Then it sends cooperation
request to a trustworthy vehicle, namely, the vehicle with
green shadow. The trustworthy vehicle drives to train station
to pick up the passenger and send him to destination.
In the following subsections, we describe the Public
board model, Private board model, behavior of normal
vehicles, trust value estimation model, and cooperation path
generating model, respectively.
4.2. Public BoardModel. All vehicles can access Public board,
which is stored in cloud storage, anywhere. Public board
stores the public estimated service quality for vehicle 𝑉𝑗
reported by vehicle𝑉𝑖, called 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 , and the timestamp at which
it was reported, called 𝑇󸀠𝑖𝑗 . Public board can be expressed by
two matrices, 𝐸󸀠 and 𝑇󸀠:
𝐸󸀠 =
[[[[[[
[
𝐸󸀠11 𝐸󸀠12 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝐸󸀠1𝑛
𝐸󸀠21 𝐸󸀠22 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝐸󸀠2𝑛
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
𝐸󸀠𝑛1 𝐸󸀠𝑛2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝐸󸀠𝑛𝑛
]]]]]]
]
,
𝑇󸀠 =
[[[[[[
[
𝑇󸀠11 𝑇󸀠12 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑇󸀠1𝑛
𝑇󸀠21 𝑇󸀠22 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑇󸀠2𝑛
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
𝑇󸀠𝑛1 𝑇󸀠𝑛2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑇󸀠𝑛𝑛
]]]]]]
]
.
(6)
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Initialize:
Initialize all scalars in 𝐸󸀠 with 0.5;
Initialize all scalars in 𝑇󸀠 with 0.
(1)While true
(2) If 𝑉𝑖 reports its estimated service quality value 󰜚 for 𝑉𝑗
(3) 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 fl 󰜚
(4) Set 𝑇󸀠𝑖𝑗 to current timestamp
(5) End If
(6) If 𝑉𝑖 inquires public estimated service quality value of 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗
(7) Send (𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 , 𝑇󸀠𝑖𝑗 ) to 𝑉𝑖
(8) End If
(9) EndWhile
Algorithm 1: The algorithm running in Public board.
The scale of 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 is between 0 and 1. 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 = 0.5 is a neutral
service quality estimation.When𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 < 0.5, the service quality
is worse than normal level. Conversely, when 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 > 0.5, the
service quality is better than normal level. 𝑇󸀠𝑖𝑗 is a value larger
than or equal to 0. 𝑇󸀠𝑖𝑗 = 0 means no updating of estimated
service quality has been committed and 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 is still the initial
value.
Vehicle can register to join VCC. For vehicle 𝑉𝑖, it sends
a registering request to Public board and report its own
service quality 𝑄𝑖, called self-estimated service quality, to it
(service quality can be fake if the vehicle is malicious) when
registering; Public board will store this service quality in 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑖
and update the corresponding𝑇󸀠𝑖𝑖 to 0. After reporting its own
service quality to 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑖 , Public board will pack all vehicles’ self-
estimated service quality together and send it to vehicle 𝑉𝑖;
vehicle𝑉𝑖 will use this information as initial service quality to
update Private board.
After initialization, Public boardwill handle the following
two events:
(1) If receiving estimated service quality for vehicle 𝑉𝑗
reported by vehicle 𝑉𝑖, Public board will update the
service quality stored in 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 and timestamp 𝑇󸀠𝑖𝑗 .
(2) If a certain vehicle inquires about the estimated
service quality for vehicle 𝑉𝑗 reported by vehicle 𝑉𝑖,
Public board will pack the service quality 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 and the
corresponding timestamp 𝑇󸀠𝑖𝑗 as a tuple (𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 , 𝑇󸀠𝑖𝑗 ) and
send it to the vehicle.
The pseudocode of Public board is presented in Algo-
rithm 1.
4.3. Private Board Model. All vehicles store Private board
in their own storage to guide the selection of trustworthy
cooperative vehicles.
For vehicle 𝑉𝑖, assume that its estimated service quality
for vehicle𝑉𝑗 is 𝐸𝑖𝑗 and its estimated trust value for vehicle𝑉𝑗
is𝑅𝑖𝑗. Both of themwill be stored in its Private board. In other
words, vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s Private board records
𝐸𝑖 = {𝐸𝑖1, 𝐸𝑖2, . . . , 𝐸𝑖𝑛} ,
𝑅𝑖 = {𝑅𝑖1, 𝑅𝑖2, . . . , 𝑅𝑖𝑛} .
(7)
The meaning of 𝐸𝑖𝑗 is similar to 𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 as described in
Section 4.2. The scale of trust value 𝑅𝑖𝑗 is between 0 and 1.
𝑅𝑖𝑗 = 0.5 is a neutral trust value estimation. When 𝑅𝑖𝑗 < 0.5,
vehicle 𝑉𝑖 thinks vehicle 𝑉𝑗 is malicious. Conversely, when
𝑅𝑖𝑗 > 0.5, vehicle 𝑉𝑖 thinks vehicle 𝑉𝑗 is normal.
Besides𝐸𝑖 and𝑅𝑖, several timestamps are stored in vehicle
𝑉𝑖’s Private board: the timestamp 𝑇𝑖𝑗 at which vehicle 𝑉𝑖
updates 𝐸𝑖𝑗 and the timestamp at which vehicle 𝑉𝑖 updates
𝑅𝑖𝑘 because of trusting in vehicle 𝑉𝑡 (this timestamp can be
divided into two subtimestamps: the subtimestamp 𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘
at which vehicle 𝑉𝑖 updates 𝑅𝑖𝑘 from column perspective
because of trusting in vehicle𝑉𝑡 and the subtimestamp 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑘
at which vehicle 𝑉𝑖 updates 𝑅𝑖𝑘 from row perspective because
of trusting in vehicle 𝑉𝑡). In other words, besides 𝐸𝑖 and 𝑅𝑖,
vehicle 𝑉𝑖 records
𝑇𝑖 = {𝑇𝑖1, 𝑇𝑖2, . . . , 𝑇𝑖𝑛} ,
𝑇col𝑖 =
[[[[[[
[
𝑇col𝑖,1→1 𝑇col𝑖,1→2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑇col𝑖,1→𝑛
𝑇col𝑖,2→1 𝑇col𝑖,2→2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑇col𝑖,2→𝑛
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
𝑇col𝑖,𝑛→1 𝑇col𝑖,𝑛→2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑇col𝑖,𝑛→𝑛
]]]]]]
]
,
𝑇row𝑖 =
[[[[[
[
𝑇row𝑖,1→1 𝑇row𝑖,1→2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑇row𝑖,1→𝑛
𝑇row𝑖,2→1 𝑇row𝑖,2→2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑇row𝑖,2→𝑛
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
𝑇row𝑖,𝑛→1 𝑇row𝑖,𝑛→2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑇row𝑖,𝑛→𝑛
]]]]]
]
.
(8)
These timestamps are stored to prevent updating Private
board using the same information repeatedly.
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4.4. Normal Vehicles. Every normal vehicle stores its own
Private board and can access Public board anywhere.
When entering VCC, all normal vehicles will send a
registering request to Public board, report their own self-
estimated service quality to Public board, and then wait for
the package sent by Public board which stores all vehicles’
self-estimated service quality to initialize its Private board.
After registering, for normal vehicle 𝑉𝑖, it will receive
a user request at some times. If vehicle 𝑉𝑖 can finish the
user’s task, it will provide services to users directly, which
forms a trivial cooperation path whose length is 1 hop (see
Figure 1(a)). If vehicle 𝑉𝑖 cannot finish the task by itself for
some reason, it will send messages to other vehicles to ask if
they can cooperate to perform this task. Vehicles which give
positive responses form setΥ. Vehicle𝑉𝑖 then uses trust value
estimation models to update its own Private board using the
information from Public board and uses the updated Private
board to compute synthesized score. Vehicle𝑉𝑖 will then send
cooperation request to vehicles in Υ with large synthesized
score. Vehicles receiving cooperation request will provide
service to vehicle 𝑉𝑖. In the process of providing service, they
may send cooperation request recursively to more vehicles.
The recursive process will form a nontrivial cooperation path
(See Figure 1(b)).
Note every cooperation path corresponds to a solution to
a service request. The service quality of a cooperation path is
defined as the minimum service quality provided by vehicles
in cooperation path. Every cooperation path consists ofmany
subcooperation paths whose starting node is an intermediate
node in original path and ending node is the ending node of
the original task.
After vehicles which received cooperation request finish
the cooperation request from vehicle 𝑉𝑖, vehicle 𝑉𝑖 will esti-
mate the quality of this service, update its own Private board,
and report the updated item to Public board selectively (they
may not report it for self-protection or privacy-protection).
Concretely speaking, vehicle 𝑉𝑖 sends cooperation
request to vehicle 𝑉𝑗, vehicle 𝑉𝑗 may finish this task by itself
or by further cooperation with other vehicles, and the service
quality provided by vehicle 𝑉𝑗 for this cooperation request is
𝑄, which is the minimum service quality in subcooperation
path starting from vehicle 𝑉𝑗 (i.e., the original cooperation
paths’ starting node is vehicle 𝑉𝑖). Vehicle 𝑉𝑖 will update 𝑅𝑖𝑗
to 𝑅 according to Formula (11), set 𝐸𝑖𝑗 to 𝑄, and update 𝑇𝑖𝑗 to
current timestamp simultaneously.
diff = 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝐸𝑖𝑗 − 𝑄
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 , (9)
𝑓 (𝑥) =
{{{{
{{{{
{
0, 𝑥 ≤ 0,
𝑥, 0 < 𝑥 < 1,
1, 𝑥 ≥ 1,
(10)
𝑅 = {{
{
𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝜎1 ∗ diff) , diff ≤ 𝜇,
𝑓 (𝑅𝑖𝑗 − 𝜎2 ∗ diff) , diff > 𝜇.
(11)
In Formula (11), 𝜇 is the threshold to check if the service
quality 𝐸𝑖𝑗 and 𝑄 are close enough; 𝜎1 and 𝜎2 are parameters
used to control the extent of change in 𝑅𝑖𝑗. diff > 𝜇;
namely, the difference between 𝐸𝑖𝑗 and 𝑄 is large, which
means the difference between estimated service quality of
this cooperation and service quality of last cooperation (or
the initial service quality of vehicle 𝑉𝑗) is large and therefore
the service quality of vehicle 𝑉𝑗, namely, 𝑄𝑗, is not stable (or
vehicle𝑉𝑗’s initial service quality is false); we should decrease
𝑅𝑖𝑗 according to parameter 𝜎2. Conversely, diff ≤ 𝜇 means
the service quality of vehicle 𝑉𝑗, namely, 𝑄𝑗, is stable (or
vehicle 𝑉𝑗’s initial service quality is true); we should increase
𝑅𝑖𝑗 according to parameter 𝜎1.
The pseudocode of normal vehicles is presented in
Algorithm 2.
4.5. Trust Value Estimation Model. Trust value estimation
model can update the information of Private board based
on Public board to increase the precision of trust value
estimation and guide the selection of cooperative vehicles.
In particular, this model will take great effects when trust
information is deficient, such as cold start stage.
Trust value estimationmodel is based on this observation:
when vehicle𝑉𝑖 trusts vehicle𝑉𝑡, the following statements are
true:
(1) The estimated service quality for vehicle 𝑉𝑡 stored in
vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s Private board, namely, 𝐸𝑖𝑡, is true.
(2) Public board’s all estimated service quality reported
by vehicle 𝑉𝑡 is true.
Vehicle 𝑉𝑖 uses this observation to update other vehicles’
trust value and estimated service quality in Private board and
prevent malicious vehicles from taking part in cooperation.
The following two rules describe the method.
Rule 1. For a certain vehicle 𝑉𝑡 with high trust value 𝑅𝑖𝑡 in
vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s Private board, if the difference between 𝐸󸀠𝑘𝑡 and𝐸𝑖𝑡 is large, where 𝑘 ∈ {𝑘 | 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑘 ̸= 𝑖 and 𝑘 ̸= 𝑡},
decrease 𝑅𝑖𝑘.
According to observation 1, the estimated service quality
for vehicle 𝑉𝑡 stored in vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s Private board, namely, 𝐸𝑖𝑡,
is true. If the difference between 𝐸󸀠𝑘𝑡 and 𝐸𝑖𝑡 is large, it is likely
that vehicle 𝑉𝑘 reports a false service quality to Public board,
which is a malicious behavior; vehicle 𝑉𝑖 should decrease its
trust value.
Rule 2. For a certain vehicle 𝑉𝑡 with high trust value 𝑅𝑖𝑡 in
vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s Private board, if 𝑇󸀠𝑡𝑟 ̸= 0, in other words, 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 has
been updated, where 𝑟 ∈ {𝑟 | 1 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑟 ̸= 𝑖 and 𝑟 ̸= 𝑡},
vehicle 𝑉𝑖 updates the Private board according to two cases.
Case 1. In the case where 𝑇𝑖𝑟 ̸= 0, in other words, 𝐸𝑖𝑟 has been
updated, if the difference between𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 and𝐸𝑖𝑟 is large, decrease𝑅𝑖𝑟. If the difference between 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 and 𝐸𝑖𝑟 is small, then check𝑅𝑖𝑟: if 𝑅𝑖𝑟 is small, then further decrease 𝑅𝑖𝑟; if 𝑅𝑖𝑟 is large, then
further increase 𝑅𝑖𝑟.
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Initialize:
Initialize all scalars in 𝐸𝑖 and 𝑅𝑖 with 0.5
Initialize all scalars in 𝑇𝑖, 𝑇col𝑖 and 𝑇row𝑖 with 0
Register itself by reporting 𝑄𝑖 to Public board
Waiting for self-estimated service quality of other vehicles sent by Public board
(1)While true
(2) Move randomly in the area
(3) If 𝑉𝑖 receives a service request
(4) If 𝑉𝑖 can finish the request
(5) Provide service to requestor directly
(6) Else
(7) Search vehicles willing to offer help
(8) Update Private board using trust value estimation model
(9) Compute synthesized score of vehicles in Υ
(10) Assume 𝑐 vehicles are needed to complete the task
(11) Set 𝛾󸀠 = {𝑉𝑘1 , 𝑉𝑘2 , . . . , 𝑉𝑘𝑐 } as vehicles in Υ with first 𝑐 largest synthesized score
(12) Send cooperation request to vehicles in 𝛾󸀠
(13) For vehicle 𝑉𝑘 in 𝛾󸀠
(14) Receive service from vehicle 𝑉𝑘 with quality 󰜚
(15) 𝐸𝑖𝑘 fl 󰜚
(16) Set 𝑇𝑖𝑘 to current time stamp
(17) Report service quality 󰜚 to Public board
(18) diff fl |𝐸𝑖𝑘 − 𝑄|
(19) If diff ≤ 𝜇
(20) 𝑅𝑖𝑘 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑘 + 𝜎1 ∗ diff)
(21) Else
(22) 𝑅𝑖𝑘 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑘 − 𝜎2 ∗ diff)
(23) End If
(24) End For
(25) End If
(26) End If
(27) EndWhile
Algorithm 2: The algorithm running in normal car 𝑉𝑖.
When the difference between 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 and 𝐸𝑖𝑟 is large, accord-
ing to observation 2, 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 is close to real value, and therefore𝐸𝑖𝑟 may deviate from the real value, which means vehicle𝑉𝑟 provides different service quality to different vehicles
maliciously. Vehicle 𝑉𝑖 should decrease 𝑅𝑖𝑟.
When the difference between 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 and 𝐸𝑖𝑟 is small, there
are two cases to analyze: both vehicle𝑉𝑖 and vehicle𝑉𝑡 believe
vehicle𝑉𝑟 ismalicious or both vehicle𝑉𝑖 and vehicle𝑉𝑡 believe
vehicle𝑉𝑟 is normal. We can use the estimated trust value for
vehicle 𝑉𝑟 stored in vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s Private board, namely, 𝑅𝑖𝑟, to
distinguish the two cases. When 𝑅𝑖𝑟 is small, vehicle 𝑉𝑖 can
infer that both vehicle 𝑉𝑖 and vehicle 𝑉𝑡 think vehicle 𝑉𝑟 is
malicious; vehicle 𝑉𝑖 further decreases 𝑅𝑖𝑟. Conversely, when𝑅𝑖𝑟 is large, vehicle𝑉𝑖 can infer that both vehicle𝑉𝑖 and vehicle𝑉𝑡 think object 𝑉𝑟 is normal; vehicle 𝑉𝑖 further increases𝑅𝑖𝑟.
Case 2. In the case where 𝑇𝑖𝑟 = 0, in other words, 𝐸𝑖𝑟 has not
been updated, if 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is large enough, make vehicle 𝑉𝑖 accept
a virtual cooperation from vehicle 𝑉𝑟 whose service quality
is 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 : set 𝐸𝑖𝑟 as 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 and update the trust value of vehicle 𝑉𝑟
according to this virtual cooperation using Formula (11).
According to observation 2, vehicle 𝑉𝑖 can update the
estimated service quality for vehicle 𝑉𝑟 in Private board
using 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 , which is a trustworthy value when vehicle 𝑉𝑡 is
trustworthy.
We will detail this model in the next two subsections.
Section 4.5.1 will give a concrete scheme; DBTEC scheme
with this section’s trust value estimation model is called
DBTEC-1. Section 4.5.2 will improve the scheme to solve cold
start problem; DBTEC scheme with this section’s improved
trust value estimation model is called DBTEC-2.
4.5.1. DBTEC-1. We detail the trust value estimation model
and propose a temporary detailed scheme called DBTEC-1
in this section, which will be further improved in the next
subsection.
Below we detail the two rules listed above.
Rule 1. For vehicle 𝑉𝑡 with trust value 𝑅𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝛾 in vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s
Private board, if 𝑇󸀠𝑘𝑡 > 𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘 ≥ 0 and diff󸀠 = |𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸󸀠𝑘𝑡 | > 𝜇,
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where 𝑘 ∈ {𝑘 | 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑘 ̸= 𝑖 and 𝑘 ̸= 𝑡}, vehicle
𝑉𝑖 decreases 𝑅𝑖𝑘 to 𝑅󸀠 according to Formula (12) and updates𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘 to current timestamp.
𝑅󸀠 = 𝑓 (𝑅𝑖𝑘 − 𝜔2 ∗ diff󸀠) . (12)
Condition 𝑇󸀠𝑘𝑡 > 𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘 ≥ 0 guarantees that 𝐸󸀠𝑘𝑡 has been
updated since initialization and vehicle 𝑉𝑖 will not update
trust value using the same information repeatedly. 𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘
is the subtimestamp at which vehicle 𝑉𝑖 updates 𝑅𝑖𝑘 from
column perspective because of trusting in vehicle𝑉𝑡. In other
words, this subtimestamp records the timestamp. Rule 1 is
used to update trust value’s last time. 𝑇󸀠𝑘𝑡 ≤ 𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘 means
no updating has been committed to 𝐸󸀠𝑘𝑡 since using Rule 1
last time. Repeat updating using the same information will
lead to error. Formula (12) means vehicle 𝑉𝑖 will decrease 𝑅𝑖𝑘
according to parameter 𝜔2 if diff󸀠 > 𝜇.
Rule 2. For a certain vehicle 𝑉𝑡 with trust value 𝑅𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝛾 in
vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s Private board, if 𝑇󸀠𝑡𝑟 > 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 ≥ 0, where 𝑟 ∈ {𝑟 |1 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑟 ̸= 𝑖 and 𝑟 ̸= 𝑡}, vehicle𝑉𝑖 updates the Private
board according to two cases.
Case 1. In the case where 𝑇𝑖𝑟 ̸= 0, in other words, 𝐸𝑖𝑟 has been
updated, suppose that the difference between 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 and 𝐸𝑖𝑟 is
diff󸀠󸀠 = |𝐸𝑖𝑟 − 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 |. If diff󸀠󸀠 > 𝜇, vehicle 𝑉𝑖 decreases 𝑅𝑖𝑟 to
𝑅󸀠󸀠 according to Formula (13) and updates 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current
timestamp:
𝑅󸀠󸀠 = 𝑓 (𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 𝜔2 ∗ diff󸀠󸀠) ; (13)
if diff󸀠󸀠 ≤ 𝜇, vehicle 𝑉𝑖 updates 𝑅𝑖𝑟 to 𝑅󸀠󸀠󸀠 using Formula (15)
and updates 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current timestamp:
dev = 𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 0.5, (14)
𝑅󸀠󸀠󸀠 = {{
{
𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 + 𝜔1 |dev|) , dev > 0,
𝑓 (𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 𝜔2 |dev|) , dev ≤ 0.
(15)
𝑅󸀠󸀠means vehicle𝑉𝑖 will decrease 𝑅𝑖𝑟 according to param-
eter𝜔2 if the difference between𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 and𝐸𝑖𝑟 is large (diff󸀠󸀠 > 𝜇).
𝑅󸀠󸀠󸀠 means that if vehicle 𝑉𝑟 is likely to be a normal vehicle,
we further increase 𝑅𝑖𝑟 according to parameter 𝜔1. The more
trustworthy vehicle 𝑉𝑟 is, the larger amount of increment 𝑅𝑖𝑟
has. Conversely, if vehicle𝑉𝑟 is likely to be amalicious vehicle,
we further decrease 𝑅𝑖𝑟 according to parameter 𝜔2. The less
trustworthy vehicle 𝑉𝑟 is, the larger amount of decrement 𝑅𝑖𝑟
has.
Case 2. In the case where 𝑇𝑖𝑟 = 0, in other words, 𝐸𝑖𝑟 has not
been updated, make vehicle 𝑉𝑖 accept a virtual cooperation
from vehicle 𝑉𝑟 whose service quality is 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 : set 𝐸𝑖𝑟 as 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 ,
update the trust value of vehicle 𝑉𝑟 according to this virtual
cooperation using Formula (11), and update 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current
timestamp.
(1) For 𝑉𝑡 in Φ/{𝑉𝑖}
(2) If 𝐸𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝛾
(3) For 𝑉𝑘 in {𝑉𝑘 | 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑘 ̸= 𝑖 and 𝑘 ̸= 𝑡}
(4) If 𝑇󸀠𝑘𝑡 > 𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘 ≥ 0
(5) diff 󸀠 fl |𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸󸀠𝑘𝑡 |
(6) If diff 󸀠 > 𝜇
(7) 𝑅𝑖𝑘 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑘 − 𝜔2 ∗ diff 󸀠)
(8) Set 𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘 to current time stamp
(9) End If
(10) End If
(11) End For
(12) For 𝑉𝑟 in {𝑉𝑟 | 1 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑟 ̸= 𝑖 and 𝑟 ̸= 𝑡}
(13) If 𝑇󸀠𝑡𝑟 > 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 ≥ 0
(14) If 𝑇𝑖𝑟 ̸= 0
(15) diff 󸀠󸀠 fl |𝐸𝑖𝑟 − 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 |
(16) If diff 󸀠󸀠 > 𝜇
(17) 𝑅𝑖𝑟 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 𝜔2 ∗ diff 󸀠󸀠)
(18) Set 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current time stamp
(19) Else
(20) dev fl 𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 0.5
(21) If dev > 0
(22) 𝑅𝑖𝑟 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 + 𝜔1 ∗ |dev|)
(23) Else
(24) 𝑅𝑖𝑟 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 𝜔2 ∗ |dev|)
(25) End If
(26) Set 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current time stamp
(27) End If
(28) Else
(29) diff fl |𝐸𝑖𝑟 − 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 |
(30) If diff ≤ 𝜇
(31) 𝑅𝑖𝑟 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 + 𝜎1 ∗ diff)
(32) Else
(33) 𝑅𝑖𝑟 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 𝜎2 ∗ diff)
(34) End If
(35) 𝐸𝑖𝑟 fl 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟
(36) Set 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current time stamp
(37) End If
(38) End If
(39) End For
(40) End If
(41) End For
Algorithm 3: DBTEC-1’s trust value estimation model in 𝑉𝑖.
The pseudocode of this scheme is presented in Algorithm
3.
4.5.2. DBTEC-2. We further improve the performance of
DBTEC-1 in this subsection.
In the beginning stage of VCC, deficiency of information
will make many trust value estimation schemes invalid. This
phenomenon is called cold start.
DBTEC-1 scheme cannot guide the selection of cooper-
ative partner well when in stage of cold start because it can
only take effect when vehicles’ trust value becomes larger than
threshold 𝛾. We can improve the original scheme based on
this observation.
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Unlike DBTEC-1, we no longer use an absolute threshold
as a starting condition of trust value estimation scheme. We
can adjust the influence of trust value estimation scheme
according to the trust value of vehicles.Themore trustworthy
the vehicle is, the more influence it will have in trust value
estimation scheme.
This improvement can significantly enhance the perfor-
mance of DBTEC-1, especially in the stage of cold start, since
it can address the trust information deficiency problem in
cold start stage, in which most of the failed cooperation
happened. DBTEC scheme with this improved trust value
estimation model is called DBTEC-2, which is an improved
version of DBTEC-1.
Below we introduce the improvement in detail.
According to the description above, two new parameters,
𝛼1 and 𝛼2, are introduced into the scheme to control the
influence of trust value estimation model. 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 can be
computed according to the following two formulas:
𝛼1 =
{{{
{{{
{
𝜔1, 𝐸𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝛾,
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 0.5) 𝜔1
𝛾 − 0.5 , 𝐸
𝑖
𝑡 < 𝛾,
(16)
𝛼2 =
{{{
{{{
{
𝜔2, 𝐸𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝛾,
(𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 0.5) 𝜔2
𝛾 − 0.5 , 𝐸
𝑖
𝑡 < 𝛾.
(17)
When 𝑅𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝛾, vehicle 𝑉𝑡 is completely trustworthy and
therefore the influence degree 𝛼1 is corresponding to 𝜔1,
which is the biggest influence degree. When 𝑅𝑖𝑡 < 𝛾, Formula
(16) maps trust value 0.5∼𝑅𝑖𝑡 to 0∼𝜔1. The larger 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is, the
larger influence degree 𝛼1 is. 𝛼2 has similar conclusion.When𝑅𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝛾, vehicle 𝑉𝑡 is completely trustworthy and therefore
the influence degree 𝛼2 is corresponding to 𝜔2, which is the
biggest influence degree. When 𝑅𝑖𝑡 < 𝛾, Formula (17) maps
trust value 0.5∼𝑅𝑖𝑡 to 0∼𝜔2.
Below are the rules of the improved scheme.
Rule 1. For a certain vehicle 𝑉𝑡 with trust value 𝑅𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0.5
in vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s Private board, compute 𝛼1 and 𝛼2. If 𝑇󸀠𝑘𝑡 >𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘 ≥ 0 and diff󸀠 = |𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸󸀠𝑘𝑡 | > 𝜇, where 𝑘 ∈ {𝑘 |
1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑘 ̸= 𝑖 and 𝑘 ̸= 𝑡}, vehicle 𝑉𝑖 decreases 𝑅𝑖𝑘
to 𝑅󸀠 according to Formula (18) and updates 𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘 to current
timestamp.
𝑅󸀠 = 𝑓 (𝑅𝑖𝑘 − 𝛼2 ∗ diff󸀠) . (18)
Rule 2. For a certain vehicle 𝑉𝑡 with trust value 𝑅𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝛾 in
vehicle𝑉𝑖’s Private board, compute 𝛼1 and 𝛼2. If𝑇󸀠𝑡𝑟 > 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 ≥0, where 𝑟 ∈ {𝑟 | 1 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑟 ̸= 𝑖 and 𝑟 ̸= 𝑡}, vehicle 𝑉𝑖
updates the Private board according to two cases.
Case 1. In the case where 𝑇𝑖𝑟 ̸= 0, in other words, 𝐸𝑖𝑟 has been
updated, suppose that the difference between 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 and 𝐸𝑖𝑟 is
diff 󸀠󸀠 = |𝐸𝑖𝑟 − 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 |. If diff 󸀠󸀠 > 𝜇, vehicle 𝑉𝑖 decreases 𝑅𝑖𝑟 to
𝑅󸀠󸀠 according to Formula (19) and updates 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current
timestamp:
𝑅󸀠󸀠 = 𝑓 (𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 𝛼2 ∗ diff 󸀠󸀠) ; (19)
if diff 󸀠󸀠 ≤ 𝜇, vehicle 𝑉𝑖 updates 𝑅𝑖𝑟 to 𝑅󸀠󸀠󸀠 using Formula (21)
and updates 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current timestamp:
dev = 𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 0.5, (20)
𝑅󸀠󸀠󸀠 = {{
{
𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼1 |dev|) , dev > 0,
𝑓 (𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 𝛼2 |dev|) , dev ≤ 0.
(21)
Case 2. In the case where 𝑇𝑖𝑟 = 0, in other words, 𝐸𝑖𝑟 has not
been updated, make vehicle 𝑉𝑖 accept a virtual cooperation
from vehicle 𝑉𝑟 whose service quality is 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 : set 𝐸𝑖𝑟 as 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 ,
update the trust value of vehicle 𝑉𝑟 according to this virtual
cooperation using Formula (11), and update 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current
timestamp.
The pseudocode of this scheme is presented in Algorithm
4.
4.6. Cooperation Path Generating Model. When vehicle 𝑉𝑖
receives a user request, such as delivering a package to person
𝑃 in a certain place as soon as possible, if vehicle𝑉𝑖 can finish
this task by itself individually, it will provide services to user
directly, which forms a trivial cooperation path whose length
is 1 hop, that is, a hop from user to vehicle 𝑉𝑖. If vehicle 𝑉𝑖
cannot finish this task by itself, for example, vehicle𝑉𝑖 cannot
deliver the package to person 𝑃 directly, vehicle 𝑉𝑖 will finish
what it can do and then send messages to other vehicles to
ask if they are willing to cooperate to perform the rest of the
task. Vehicles give positive response form set Υ. Vehicle 𝑉𝑖
will select several vehicles in set Υ according to computed
synthesized scores and send cooperation request to them.
Assume that vehicle𝑉𝑗 has received cooperation request from
vehicle 𝑉𝑖. If vehicle 𝑉𝑗 can finish the task, it will provide
services to vehicle 𝑉𝑖. If vehicle 𝑉𝑗 still cannot perform the
task by itself, it will do what it can do and further recursively
send the cooperation request to other vehicles just like vehicle
𝑉𝑖.This recursive process forms a nontrivial cooperation path
(see Figure 1). The cooperation path starting from vehicle 𝑉𝑗
can be viewed as a subcooperation path of the cooperation
path starting from 𝑉𝑖 as described in Section 4.4. Note that
a cooperation path is corresponding to a solution to a user
request.
The key problem in constructing cooperation path is how
to guarantee the quality and the safety of service provided
by the cooperation path. Users always want to receive service
with high quality under the condition that the safety of this
service can be guaranteed. For example, users who want to
deliver a package to person 𝑃 expect the package to be sent to
person 𝑃 as soon as possible without any damage.
To overcome the key problem, three factors have to be
considered: the trust value, the service quality, and the near
completion degree of cooperative vehicles.
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(1) For 𝑉𝑡 in Φ/{𝑉𝑖}
(2) If 𝐸𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0.5
(3) Compute 𝛼1 and 𝛼2
(4) For 𝑉𝑘 in {𝑉𝑘 | 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑘 ̸= 𝑖 and 𝑘 ̸= 𝑡}
(5) If 𝑇󸀠𝑘𝑡 > 𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘 ≥ 0
(6) diff 󸀠 fl |𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸󸀠𝑘𝑡 |
(7) If diff 󸀠 > 𝜇
(8) 𝑅𝑖𝑘 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑘 − 𝛼2 ∗ diff 󸀠)
(9) Set 𝑇col𝑖,𝑡→𝑘 to current time stamp
(10) End If
(11) End If
(12) End For
(13) For 𝑉𝑟 in {𝑉𝑟 | 1 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑟 ̸= 𝑖 and 𝑟 ̸= 𝑡}
(14) If 𝑇󸀠𝑡𝑟 > 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 ≥ 0
(15) If 𝑇𝑖𝑟 ̸= 0
(16) diff 󸀠󸀠 fl |𝐸𝑖𝑟 − 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 |
(17) If diff 󸀠󸀠 > 𝜇
(18) 𝑅𝑖𝑟 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 𝛼2 ∗ diff 󸀠󸀠)
(19) Set 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current time stamp
(20) Else
(21) dev fl 𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 0.5
(22) If dev > 0
(23) 𝑅𝑖𝑟 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 + 𝛼1 ∗ |dev|)
(24) Else
(25) 𝑅𝑖𝑟 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 𝛼2 ∗ |dev|)
(26) End If
(27) Set 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current time stamp
(28) End If
(29) Else
(30) If 𝐸𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝛾
(31) diff fl |𝐸𝑖𝑟 − 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟 |
(32) If diff ≤ 𝜇
(33) 𝑅𝑖𝑟 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 + 𝜎1 ∗ diff)
(34) Else
(35) 𝑅𝑖𝑟 fl 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑟 − 𝜎2 ∗ diff)
(36) End If
(37) 𝐸𝑖𝑟 fl 𝐸󸀠𝑡𝑟
(38) Set 𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑟 to current time stamp
(39) End If
(40) End If
(41) End If
(42) End For
(43) End If
(44) End For
Algorithm 4: DBTEC-2’s trust value estimation model in 𝑉𝑖.
The estimated trust value and the service quality are
known to vehicles. The near completion degree of a vehicle
means to what extent can this vehicle perform the task.
When vehicle 𝑉𝑖 sends messages to vehicle 𝑉𝑗 and asks if
it is willing to cooperate, vehicle 𝑉𝑗 will report the near
completion degree of itself on this task to vehicle 𝑉𝑖 if it is
willing to cooperate. The near completion degree is different
from the service quality, which means the quality of service
provided by vehicles in the process of providing service.
For example, when the task is delivering a package, the
near completion degree of vehicle 𝑉𝑗 is how far vehicle 𝑉𝑗
can deliver this package (it may pass the package on to
another cooperative partner after delivering the packages to
the farthest place it can reach). Obviously, in order to reduce
the length of cooperation path as much as possible, vehicles
should greedily choose the vehicle which can do more parts
of the task as their cooperative partner. Because the greedy
strategy will indirectly minimize the failure rate of cooper-
ation, there is a certain probability of choosing malicious
vehicles when sending cooperation request. Therefore the
longer the cooperation path is, the more choices to be made
are and the larger the probability that malicious vehicles get
opportunities to provide services is.
Assume that the estimated service quality for vehicle 𝑉𝑗
stored in vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s Private board is 𝐸𝑖𝑗, the estimated trust
value for vehicle 𝑉𝑗 stored in vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s Private board is
𝑅𝑖𝑗, and vehicle 𝑉𝑗’s normalized near completion degree on
task 𝜉 is 𝐶𝜉𝑗 . We can synthesize the three factors and use
them to compute the synthesized score which can guide
the selection of cooperative vehicles. Vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s synthesized
score to vehicle 𝑉𝑗 is
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝜆1𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆2𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆3𝐶𝜉𝑗 , (22)
where 𝜆1 > 0, 𝜆2 > 0, 𝜆3 > 0, and 𝜆1 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆3 = 1.
When selecting cooperative vehicles, vehicle 𝐴 will com-
pute synthesized score of vehicles in setΥ and choose vehicles
with large synthesized score to cooperate with.
The algorithm of generating cooperation path is pre-
sented in Algorithm 5.
5. Performance Analysis and
Experimental Results
5.1. Overview. In this section, we will prove the effectiveness
of DBTEC schemes by theoretical analysis and extensive
experiments. In Section 5.2, the time complexity of DBTEC
schemes is given to illustrate the theoretical performance of
DBTEC schemes. In Section 5.3, the performance of DBTEC
schemes is analyzed by experiments and simulations.
All simulation programs are implemented by C++ with
Visual Studio 2013. The proportion of malicious vehicles to
all vehicles is 40%∼70%; the time interval between two con-
secutive timestamp is defined as 15 minutes. In a timestamp,
the probability of receiving user requests for every vehicle is
20% in experiments of the average estimated trust value and
the success ratio of each stage and 70% in experiments of the
total success ratio of cooperation requests.
Five threat models are analyzed in Section 5.3. They
are reporting false self-estimated service quality, pretending
to be normal vehicles, slandering normal vehicles, praising
malicious partners, and providing unstable services. They all
have been described in Section 3.2.
Three major indexes are computed in each threat model.
They are the average estimated trust value of malicious
and normal vehicles, the total success ratio of cooperation
requests, and the success ratio of each stage.
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Initialize:
vehicle 𝐴 receives a service request 𝜉
(1) If 𝑉𝑖 can finish task 𝜉
(2) 𝑉𝑖 can finish task 𝜉
(3) Return 𝑉𝑖’s service quality
(4) Else
(5) Subdivide task 𝜉 into 𝜉0, 𝜉1, 𝜉2, . . . , 𝜉𝑘
(6) 𝑉𝑖 finishes the subtask 𝜉0
(7) Search vehicles willing to perform the rest of tasks which form set 𝛾 and receive their 𝐶𝜉𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝛾)
(8) Compute synthesized score of vehicles in 𝛾
(9) Select vehicles with the first 𝑘 largest synthesized score which forms set 𝛾𝑘
(10) For 𝑉𝑡 in 𝛾𝑘
(11) Call Algorithm 5 with 𝜉𝑘
(12) End For
(13) End If
Algorithm 5: Cooperation path generating model.
The performances of three schemes are analyzed in each
index. They are traditional scheme, DBTEC-1, and DBTEC-
2. In traditional scheme, Public board is deprecated and
vehicles can only acquire trust information by direct inter-
action [28]. More concretely speaking, traditional scheme
can be regarded as a reduction version of DBTEC scheme
without Public board model and trust value estimation
model. DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-2 are proposed in Section 4.5.
DBTEC-2 is an improved version of DBTEC-1, which can
address the trust information problem in cold start stage as
illustrated in Section 4.5.2.
5.2. Complexity Analysis. Assume that we use the number of
vehicles involved in VCC, that is, ℎ, as the measure to model
the input size of the scheme, which is a natural choice in this
scenario. It is easy to analyze the time complexity of DBTEC
schemes.
In DBTEC-1 scheme, the whole structure of the pseu-
docode is formed by two-tier nested loops. The maximum
running number of outer loops is 𝑂(ℎ). In worst cases,
the maximum running number of inner loops is also 𝑂(ℎ).
Therefore, the worst-case time complexity of DBTEC-1 is
𝑂(ℎ2), which can be immediately computed by vehicular
chips.
DBTEC-2 scheme is very similar to DBTEC-1 except that
a little extra computation is introduced to compute 𝛼1 and𝛼2, which is 𝑂(1). Therefore, the worst-case time complexity
of DBTEC-2 is also (ℎ2), which can be immediately computed
by vehicular chips.
5.3. Performance in Various Threat Models
5.3.1. Reporting False Self-Estimated Service Quality. This is
a comparatively simple treat model. In this model, malicious
vehicles will report a mendacious self-estimated service qual-
ity to Public board when registering. When seeking cooper-
ative partners, vehicles tend to send cooperation requests to
vehicles with high service quality. Malicious vehicles expect
to deceive them using the mendacious self-estimated service
quality. After registering, malicious vehicles will move in the
limited area and wait for cooperation requests, but they will
not accept any user requests in these threat models.
We first analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-2
on average estimated trust value in this threat model.
Figure 3 illustrates the increment of average estimated
trust value of normal vehicles as time goes on using tradi-
tional scheme, DBTEC-1, and DBTEC-2, respectively. The
horizontal axis of this figure is timestamp and the vertical
axis is the estimated trust value of normal vehicles. As
illustrated by Figure 3, in traditional scheme, the increment
of average estimated trust value of normal vehicles is slow, but
when using DBTEC scheme the speed of increment increases
significantly. When comparing DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-2, it is
obvious thatDBTEC-2 increases the speed of incrementmore
significantly compared to DBTEC-1, especially when in the
stage of cold start, which proves the improvement of DBTEC-
2 as illustrated in Section 4.5.2.
Figure 4 illustrates the decrement of average estimated
trust value of malicious vehicles as time goes on using
traditional scheme, DBTEC-1, and DBTEC-2, respectively.
The horizontal axis of this figure is timestamp and the
vertical axis is the estimated trust value of malicious vehi-
cles. As illustrated by Figure 4, in traditional scheme, the
decrement of average estimated trust value of malicious
vehicles is slow, but when using DBTEC schemes the speed of
decrement increases significantly.When comparing DBTEC-
1 and DBTEC-2, it is obvious that DBTEC-2 increases the
speed of decrement more significantly compared to DBTEC-
1, especially when in the stage of cold start, which proves the
improvement of DBTEC-2 as illustrated in Section 4.5.2.
In general, Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that DBTEC has
significantly positive influence on estimating trust value of
vehicles. DBTEC-2 performs much better than DBTEC-1,
especially in the stage of cold start.
Then, we analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-
2 on total success ratio of cooperation requests in this threat
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Figure 3: Time-average trust value of normal vehicles.
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Figure 4: Time-average trust value of malicious vehicles.
model. The success ratio is defined as the proportion of
cooperation requests sent to normal vehicles to total coop-
eration requests in a certain timespan. The total success ratio
is defined as the success ratio from initialization to current
timestamp. Figure 5 illustrates the increment of total success
ratio as time goes on using traditional scheme, DBTEC-1,
and DBTEC-2, respectively. The horizontal axis of this figure
is timestamp and the vertical axis is the total success ratio
from initialization to current timestamp. As illustrated by
Figure 5, the positive influence of DBTEC-1 on total success
ratio is comparatively small when compared with the positive
influence of DBTEC-2. Particularly in the stage of cold start,
the total success ratio of DBTEC-1 is nearly equal to the total
success ratio of traditional scheme. DBTEC-2 outperforms
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Figure 5: Time-total success ratio.
DBTEC-1 and traditional scheme significantly in the total
success ratio.
This phenomenon can be explained by the following
observation: total success ratio is dominated by the cooper-
ation requests sent in the stage of cold start. In the stage of
cold start, the deficiency of trust information leads to a lot of
mistaken selections of cooperative partners, which dominate
the change of total success ratio. The more mistakes made
in this stage are, the less total success ratio is. As time goes
on, vehicles’ direct interaction accumulated a lot of trust
information which can guide the selection of cooperative
partners effectively. The changes of total success ratio in
traditional scheme and in DBTEC scheme tend to be similar
in this stage. The reason why DBTEC-1’s positive influence is
small, especially in the stage of cold start, is thatDBTEC-1will
take effects when some vehicles’ trust information is larger
than 𝛾. In other words, DBTEC-1 may not take effects in the
stage of cold start and the behavior ofDBTEC-1 in that stage is
very similar to the behavior of traditional scheme. When this
condition is satisfied, traditional scheme has accumulated
a lot of trust information to guide its cooperative partners’
selection and DBTEC-1 can only take effects in limited cases.
However,DBTEC-2 can provide trust information even in the
stage of cold start, which sharply reducesmistaken selections.
That is why it is far better than DBTEC-1 and traditional
scheme.
In general, DBTEC is better than traditional scheme in
the total success ratio, DBTEC-2 increases much more total
success ratio compared to DBTEC-1 and traditional scheme,
and DBTEC-1 increases the total success ratio in a small
amount.
Finally, we analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and
DBTEC-2 on the success ratio of each stage in this threat
model. We set every 50 timestamps as a stage in the exper-
iment. The success ratio of each stage is the success ratio in
timespan of 50 timestamps. Figure 6 illustrates the increment
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Figure 6: Time-success ratio of stages.
of the success ratio of each stage, namely, each 50 timestamps.
The horizontal axis of this figure is timestamp and the vertical
axis is the success ratio of the stage the timestamp belongs
to. As illustrated by Figure 6, the success ratio of stages
of both traditional scheme and DBTEC schemes increases
as time goes on. Both DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-2’s increasing
speed outperforms traditional scheme.DBTEC-2’s increasing
speed outperforms DBTEC-1 in every stage significantly; this
phenomenon is significant especially in the stage of cold start.
In general, DBTEC’ success ratio of each stage is larger than
traditional scheme in each stage. DBTEC-2 increases larger
success ratio of each stage compared to DBTEC-1, especially
in the stage of cold start.
5.3.2. Pretending to Be Normal Vehicles. This threat model
is more complicated than the previous one. In this model,
malicious vehicles not only will report mendacious self-
estimated service quality to Public boardwhen registering but
also will pretend to be normal vehicles and perform the same
as them. Experimental results proof, in this threatmodel, that
DBTEC will distinguish malicious vehicles and normal ones
better than the former threat model; DBTEC-2 has better
effects than DBTEC-1.
We first analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-2
on average estimated trust value in this threat model.
Figure 7 illustrates the increment of average estimated
trust value of normal vehicles as time goes on using tradi-
tional scheme, DBTEC-1, and DBTEC-2, respectively. The
horizontal axis and the vertical axis of this figure are the
same as Figure 3. As illustrated by Figure 7, similar results
will be obtained as in Figure 3. In traditional scheme, the
increment of average estimated trust value of normal vehicles
is slow, but when using DBTEC schemes the speed of
increment increases significantly. When comparing DBTEC-
1 and DBTEC-2, it is obvious that DBTEC-2 increases the
speed of incrementmore significantly compared toDBTEC-1,
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Figure 7: Time-average trust value of normal vehicles.
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Figure 8: Time-average trust value of malicious vehicles.
especially when in the stage of cold start, which proves the
improvement of DBTEC-2 as illustrated in Section 4.5.2.
Figure 8 illustrates the decrement of average estimated
trust value of malicious vehicles as time goes on using tra-
ditional scheme, DBTEC-1, and DBTEC-2, respectively. The
horizontal axis and the vertical axis of this figure are the same
as Figure 4. As illustrated by Figure 8, similar results will be
obtained as in Figure 4; in traditional scheme, the decrement
of average estimated trust value of malicious vehicles is
slow, but when using DBTEC schemes the speed of decre-
ment increases significantly. When comparing DBTEC-1 and
DBTEC-2, it is obvious that DBTEC-2 increases the speed
16 Mobile Information Systems
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Figure 9: Time-total success ratio.
of decrement more significantly compared to DBTEC-1,
especially when in the stage of cold start, which proves the
improvement of DBTEC-2 as illustrated in Section 4.5.2.
In general, Figures 7 and 8 illustrate that DBTEC has
significantly positive influence on estimating trust value of
vehicles. DBTEC-2 performs much better than DBTEC-1,
especially in the stage of cold start. DBTEC schemes can take
effects even in more complicated situations.
Then, we analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-
2 on total success ratio of cooperation requests in this threat
model. Figure 9 illustrates the increment of total success
ratio as time goes on using traditional scheme, DBTEC-
1, and DBTEC-2, respectively. The horizontal axis and the
vertical axis are the same as Figure 5. As illustrated by
Figure 9, similar results will be obtained as in Figure 5;
the positive influence of DBTEC-1 on total success ratio
is comparatively small when compared with the positive
influence of DBTEC-2. Particularly in the stage of cold start,
the total success ratio of DBTEC-1 is nearly equal to the total
success ratio of traditional scheme. DBTEC-2 outperforms
DBTEC-1 and traditional scheme significantly in the total
success ratio. In general, Figure 9 illustrates that DBTEC
is better than traditional scheme in the total success ratio,
DBTEC-2 increases much more total success ratio compared
to DBTEC-1 and traditional scheme, and DBTEC-1 increases
the total success ratio in a small amount.
Finally, we analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and
DBTEC-2 on the success ratio of each stage in this threat
model. The experimental method is the same as Figure 6.
Figure 10 illustrates the increment of the success ratio of each
stage, namely, each 50 timestamps. The horizontal axis and
the vertical axis are the same as Figure 6. As illustrated by
Figure 10, similar results will be obtained as in Figure 6.
The success ratio of stages of both traditional scheme and
DBTEC schemes increases as time goes on. Both DBTEC-
1 and DBTEC-2’s increasing speed outperforms traditional
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Figure 10: Time-success ratio of stages.
scheme. DBTEC-2’s increasing speed outperforms DBTEC-
1 in every stage significantly; this phenomenon is significant
especially in the stage of cold start. In general, Figure 10
illustrates that DBTEC’ success ratio of each stage is larger
than traditional scheme in each stage. DBTEC-2 increases
larger success ratio of each stage compared to DBTEC-1,
especially in the stage of cold start.
5.3.3. Slandering Normal Vehicles. In this model, malicious
vehicles not only will report mendacious self-estimated ser-
vice quality to Public board when registering but also will
report low estimated service quality of normal vehicles to
slander them even if these normal vehicles never provide
services to them. By slandering normal vehicles, malicious
vehicles’ opportunities of providing services increase indi-
rectly.This can be regarded as a collusion attack as illustrated
in Section 3.2. Experimental results proof that DBTEC will
also distinguish malicious vehicles and normal ones in this
threat model; DBTEC-2 has better effects than DBTEC-1.
We first analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-2
on average estimated trust value in this threat model.
Figure 11 illustrates the increment of average estimated
trust value of normal vehicles as time goes on using tradi-
tional scheme, DBTEC-1, and DBTEC-2, respectively. The
horizontal axis and the vertical axis of this figure are the
same as Figure 3. As illustrated by Figure 11, similar results
will be obtained as in Figure 3. In traditional scheme, the
increment of average estimated trust value of normal vehicles
is slow, but when using DBTEC schemes the speed of
increment increases significantly. When comparing DBTEC-
1 and DBTEC-2, it is obvious that DBTEC-2 increases the
speed of increment more significantly compared to DBTEC-
1, especially when in the stage of cold start, which proves the
improvement of DBTEC-2 as illustrated in Section 4.5.2.
Figure 12 illustrates the decrement of average estimated
trust value of malicious vehicles as time goes on using
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Figure 11: Time-average trust value of normal vehicles.
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Figure 12: Time-average trust value of malicious vehicles.
traditional scheme, DBTEC-1, and DBTEC-2, respectively.
The horizontal axis and the vertical axis of this figure are
the same as Figure 4. As illustrated by Figure 12, similar
results will be obtained as in Figure 4; in traditional scheme,
the decrement of average estimated trust value of malicious
vehicles is slow, but when using DBTEC schemes the speed of
decrement increases significantly.When comparing DBTEC-
1 and DBTEC-2, it is obvious that DBTEC-2 increases
the speed of decrement more significantly than DBTEC-1,
especially when in the stage of cold start, which proves the
improvement of DBTEC-2 as illustrated in Section 4.5.2.
In general, Figures 11 and 12 illustrate that DBTEC has
significantly positive influence on estimating trust value of
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Figure 13: Time-total success ratio.
vehicles. DBTEC-2 performs much better than DBTEC-1,
especially in the stage of cold start. DBTEC schemes can take
effects even in complicated situations.
Then, we analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-
2 on total success ratio of cooperation requests in this threat
model. Figure 13 illustrates the increment of total success
ratio as time goes on using traditional scheme, DBTEC-
1, and DBTEC-2, respectively. The horizontal axis and the
vertical axis are the same as Figure 5. As illustrated by
Figure 13, similar results will be obtained as in Figure 5;
the positive influence of DBTEC-1 on total success ratio
is comparatively small when compared with the positive
influence of DBTEC-2. Particularly in the stage of cold start,
the total success ratio of DBTEC-1 is nearly equal to the total
success ratio of traditional scheme. DBTEC-2 outperforms
DBTEC-1 and traditional scheme significantly in the total
success ratio. In general, Figure 13 illustrates that DBTEC
is better than traditional scheme in the total success ratio,
DBTEC-2 increases much more total success ratio compared
to DBTEC-1 and traditional scheme, and DBTEC-1 increases
the total success ratio in a small amount.
Finally, we analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and
DBTEC-2 on the success ratio of each stage in this threat
model. The experimental method is the same as Figure 6.
Figure 14 illustrates the increment of the success ratio of each
stage, namely, each 50 timestamps. The horizontal axis and
the vertical axis are the same as Figure 6. As illustrated by
Figure 14, similar results will be obtained as in Figure 6. The
success ratio of stages of both traditional scheme andDBTEC
schemes increases as time goes on. Both DBTEC-1 and
DBTEC-2’s increasing speed outperforms traditional scheme.
DBTEC-2’s increasing speed outperforms DBTEC-1 in every
stage significantly; this phenomenon is significant especially
in the stage of cold start. In general, Figure 14 illustrates that
DBTEC’ success ratio of each stage is larger compared to
traditional scheme in each stage. DBTEC-2 increases larger
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Figure 14: Time-success ratio of stages.
success ratio of each stage compared to DBTEC-1, especially
in the stage of cold start.
5.3.4. Praising Partners and Slandering Normal Vehicles. In
this model, which can be regarded as a stronger collusion
attack than the previousmodel, malicious vehicles will report
mendacious self-estimated service quality to Public board
when registering, report low estimated service quality of
normal vehicles to slander them even if these normal vehicles
never provide services to them, and praise other malicious
partners by reporting high estimated service quality of
them. By slandering normal vehicles, malicious vehicles’
opportunities of providing services increase indirectly. By
collusively praising malicious partners, the overall number
of opportunities of malicious vehicles increases significantly.
Experimental results proof that DBTEC will also distinguish
malicious vehicles and normal ones in this threat model;
DBTEC-2 has better effects than DBTEC-1.
We first analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-2
on average estimated trust value in this threat model.
Figure 15 illustrates the increment of average estimated
trust value of normal vehicles as time goes on using tradi-
tional scheme, DBTEC-1, and DBTEC-2, respectively. The
horizontal axis and the vertical axis of this figure are the
same as Figure 3. As illustrated by Figure 15, similar results
will be obtained as in Figure 3. In traditional scheme, the
increment of average estimated trust value of normal vehicles
is slow, but when using DBTEC schemes the speed of
increment increases significantly. When comparing DBTEC-
1 and DBTEC-2, it is obvious that DBTEC-2 increases the
speed of increment more significantly compared to DBTEC-
1, especially when in the stage of cold start, which proves the
improvement of DBTEC-2 as illustrated in Section 4.5.2.
Figure 16 illustrates the decrement of average estimated
trust value of malicious vehicles as time goes on using
traditional scheme, DBTEC-1, and DBTEC-2, respectively.
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Figure 15: Time-average trust value of normal vehicles.
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Figure 16: Time-average trust value of malicious vehicles.
The horizontal axis and the vertical axis of this figure are
the same as Figure 4. As illustrated by Figure 16, similar
results will be obtained as in Figure 4; in traditional scheme,
the decrement of average estimated trust value of malicious
vehicles is slow, but when using DBTEC schemes the speed of
decrement increases significantly.When comparing DBTEC-
1 and DBTEC-2, it is obvious that DBTEC-2 increases the
speed of decrement more significantly compared to DBTEC-
1, especially when in the stage of cold start, which proves the
improvement of DBTEC-2 as illustrated in Section 4.5.2.
In general, Figures 15 and 16 illustrate that DBTEC has
significantly positive influence on estimating trust value of
vehicles. DBTEC-2 performs much better than DBTEC-1,
Mobile Information Systems 19
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especially in the stage of cold start. DBTEC schemes can take
effects even in complicated situations.
Then, we analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-
2 on total success ratio of cooperation requests in this threat
model. Figure 17 illustrates the increment of total success
ratio as time goes on using traditional scheme, DBTEC-
1, and DBTEC-2, respectively. The horizontal axis and the
vertical axis are the same as Figure 5. As illustrated by
Figure 17, similar results will be obtained as in Figure 5;
the positive influence of DBTEC-1 on total success ratio
is comparatively small when compared with the positive
influence of DBTEC-2. Particularly in the stage of cold start,
the total success ratio of DBTEC-1 is nearly equal to the total
success ratio of traditional scheme. DBTEC-2 outperforms
DBTEC-1 and traditional scheme significantly in the total
success ratio. In general, Figure 17 illustrates that DBTEC
is better than traditional scheme in the total success ratio,
DBTEC-2 increases much more total success ratio than
DBTEC-1 and traditional scheme, andDBTEC-1 increases the
total success ratio in a small amount.
Finally, we analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and
DBTEC-2 on the success ratio of each stage in this threat
model. The experimental method is the same as Figure 6.
Figure 18 illustrates the increment of the success ratio of each
stage, namely, each 50 timestamps. The horizontal axis and
the vertical axis are the same as Figure 6. As illustrated by
Figure 18, similar results will be obtained as in Figure 6.
The success ratio of stages of both traditional scheme and
DBTEC schemes increases as time goes on. Both DBTEC-
1 and DBTEC-2’s increasing speed outperforms traditional
scheme. DBTEC-2’s increasing speed outperforms DBTEC-
1 in every stage significantly; this phenomenon is significant
especially in the stage of cold start. In general, Figure 18
illustrates that DBTEC’ success ratio of each stage is larger
than traditional scheme in each stage. DBTEC-2 increases
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Figure 18: Time-success ratio of stages.
larger success ratio of each stage compared to DBTEC-1,
especially in the stage of cold start.
5.3.5. Providing Unstable Services. This threat model is the
most complicated because of the disguise of malicious vehi-
cles. When registering, malicious vehicles will report a men-
dacious self-estimated service quality to Public board; as time
goes on, malicious vehicles have an unstable performance.
Sometimes, they will act just the same as normal vehicles,
but, sometimes, they will provide abnormal services, such
as extremely poor service quality. Experimental results proof
that DBTEC will also distinguish malicious vehicles and
normal ones in this threat model. DBTEC-2 has better effects
than DBTEC-1.
We first analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-2
on average estimated trust value in this threat model.
Figure 19 illustrates the increment of average estimated
trust value of normal vehicles as time goes on using tradi-
tional scheme, DBTEC-1, and DBTEC-2, respectively. The
horizontal axis and the vertical axis of this figure are the
same as Figure 3. As illustrated by Figure 19, similar results
will be obtained as in Figure 3. In traditional scheme, the
increment of average estimated trust value of normal vehicles
is slow, but when using DBTEC schemes the speed of
increment increases significantly. When comparing DBTEC-
1 and DBTEC-2, it is obvious that DBTEC-2 increases the
speed of incrementmore significantly compared toDBTEC-1,
especially when in the stage of cold start, and the final average
estimated trust value is larger than DBTEC-1, which proves
the improvement of DBTEC-2 as illustrated in Section 4.5.2.
Figure 20 illustrates the decrement of average estimated
trust value of malicious vehicles as time goes on using
traditional scheme, DBTEC-1, and DBTEC-2, respectively.
The horizontal axis and the vertical axis of this figure are
the same as Figure 4. As illustrated by Figure 20, similar
results will be obtained as in Figure 4; in traditional scheme,
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Figure 19: Time-average trust value of normal vehicles.
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Figure 20: Time-average trust value of malicious vehicles.
the decrement of average estimated trust value of malicious
vehicles is slow, but when using DBTEC schemes the speed of
decrement increases significantly.When comparing DBTEC-
1 and DBTEC-2, it is obvious that DBTEC-2 increases the
speed of decrement more significantly compared to DBTEC-
1, especially when in the stage of cold start, and the final aver-
age estimated trust value is less than DBTEC-1, which proves
the improvement of DBTEC-2 as illustrated in Section 4.5.2.
In general, Figures 19 and 20 illustrate that DBTEC has
significantly positive influence on estimating trust value of
vehicles. DBTEC-2 performs much better than DBTEC-1,
especially in the stage of cold start. DBTEC schemes can take
effects even in these complicated situations.
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Figure 21: Time-total success ratio.
Then, we analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and DBTEC-
2 on total success ratio of cooperation requests in this threat
model. Figure 21 illustrates the increment of total success
ratio as time goes on using traditional scheme, DBTEC-
1, and DBTEC-2, respectively. The horizontal axis and the
vertical axis are the same as Figure 5. As illustrated by
Figure 21, similar results will be obtained as in Figure 5;
the positive influence of DBTEC-1 on total success ratio
is comparatively small when compared with the positive
influence of DBTEC-2. Particularly in the stage of cold start,
the total success ratio of DBTEC-1 is nearly equal to the total
success ratio of traditional scheme. DBTEC-2 outperforms
DBTEC-1 and traditional scheme significantly in the total
success ratio. In general, Figure 21 illustrates that DBTEC
is better than traditional scheme in the total success ratio,
DBTEC-2 increases much more total success ratio than
DBTEC-1 and traditional scheme, andDBTEC-1 increases the
total success ratio in a small amount.
Finally, we analyze the influence of DBTEC-1 and
DBTEC-2 on the success ratio of each stage in this threat
model. The experimental method is the same as Figure 6.
Figure 22 illustrates the increment of the success ratio of each
stage, namely, each 50 timestamps. The horizontal axis and
the vertical axis are the same as Figure 6. As illustrated by
Figure 22, similar results will be obtained as in Figure 6.
The success ratio of stages of both traditional scheme and
DBTEC schemes increases as time goes on. Both DBTEC-
1 and DBTEC-2’s increasing speed outperforms traditional
scheme. DBTEC-2’s increasing speed outperforms DBTEC-
1 in every stage significantly; this phenomenon is significant
especially in the stage of cold start. In general, Figure 22
illustrates that DBTEC’ success ratio of each stage is larger
than traditional scheme in each stage. DBTEC-2 increases
larger success ratio of each stage compared to DBTEC-1,
especially in the stage of cold start.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a trust-based security cooperation
model, called DBTEC, which combines direct trust informa-
tion stored in Private board with indirect trust information
stored in Public board to guide the selection of cooperative
partners in VCC. The experiments prove the effectiveness of
DBTEC schemes.
With the advance of Internet ofThings, the form of many
practical applications, such as delivering physical objects, has
changed. Vehicle networks have made extensive cooperation
between vehicles possible. Security is a key requirement for
cooperation. The DBTEC schemes give a better solution to
security cooperation.
Notations
Φ: The set of all vehicles in VCC
𝑛: The number of vehicles in VCC
𝑉𝑖: The 𝑖th vehicle in VCC𝑄: The set of service qualities of all vehicles
𝑄𝑖: The 𝑖th vehicle’s self-estimated service quality𝑀: The set of malicious vehicles in VCC
𝑁: The set of normal vehicles in VCC
ℎ: The number of malicious vehicles in VCC
𝐸󸀠𝑖𝑗 : The public estimated service quality for
vehicle 𝑉𝑗 reported by vehicle 𝑉𝑖
𝑇󸀠𝑖𝑗 : The timestamp at which vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s
estimated service quality for vehicle 𝑉𝑗 is
reported
𝐸𝑖𝑗: Estimated service quality for vehicle 𝑉𝑗 in
vehicle 𝑉𝑖’s Private board𝑅𝑖𝑗: Estimated trust value for vehicle 𝑉𝑗 in vehicle𝑉𝑖’s Private board𝑇𝑖𝑗: The timestamp at which vehicle𝑉𝑖 updates 𝐸𝑖𝑗
𝑇col𝑖 : The timestamp at which vehicle 𝑉𝑖 updates𝑅𝑖𝑘 from column perspective because of
trusting in vehicle 𝑉𝑡𝑇row𝑖,𝑡→𝑘: The timestamp at which vehicle 𝑉𝑖 updates𝑅𝑖𝑘 from row perspective because of trusting
in vehicle 𝑉𝑡.
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